Review Article | 28 Mar 2026

Operational zoonotic containment of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus in Saudi Arabia: An implementation-oriented One Health genomic framework

Shuaibu Abdullahi Hudu1,2 and Abdulgafar Olayiwola Jimoh3Show more
VETERINARY WORLD | pg no. 1322-1341 | Vol. 19, Issue 3 | DOI: 10.14202/vetworld.2026.1322-1341
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Abstract

Background and Aim: Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) remains a persistent zoonotic threat more than a decade after its first detection, with Saudi Arabia continuing to be the global epicenter of human infections and the main reservoir interface through dromedary camels. Despite ongoing surveillance, advances in molecular diagnostics, and research on vaccines and therapeutics, sporadic zoonotic spillovers and healthcare-associated outbreaks still occur, showing that current prevention strategies are still not enough. This review compiles current evidence from epidemiological studies, camel reservoir research, genomic monitoring, and public health reports published between 2012 and April 2025 to identify the key gaps preventing effective containment. Special focus is given to recent genomic discoveries, including post-2022 clade B sublineages, recombination events, and spike protein changes that might affect transmission and the effectiveness of countermeasures. Available data suggest that MERS-CoV epidemiology is driven by repeated camel-to-human transmission, followed by occasional amplification in healthcare settings rather than sustained community spread. High seroprevalence and frequent detection of viral RNA in juvenile camels, seasonal gathering in markets, and extensive animal movement networks contribute to ongoing viral circulation at the animal–human interface. Genomic studies consistently show close phylogenetic relationships between camel and human isolates, confirming recurrent zoonotic transmissions. However, fragmented surveillance systems, delayed genomic data integration, inconsistent biosecurity practices, and limited field evidence for camel vaccination pose major barriers to control. Additionally, hospital outbreaks continue to occur due to delayed diagnosis, overcrowding, and incomplete adherence to infection-prevention protocols, underscoring the need for improved clinical preparedness. Based on the integrated synthesis of epidemiological, veterinary, and genomic evidence, this review proposes an implementation-focused One Health genomic framework tailored to the Saudi context. The proposed roadmap highlights real-time connection of human and camel surveillance, expands genomic sequencing capacity, targets vaccination strategies in camels and high-risk human populations, standardizes biosecurity measures in markets and abattoirs, and strengthens infection control systems in healthcare facilities. Alignment with national governance structures and Saudi Vision 2030 offers a practical pathway for coordinated multi-sectoral action. This review concludes that MERS-CoV is unlikely to be eradicated soon, but it can be effectively managed through a genomics-enabled, operational One Health approach that combines surveillance, vaccination, clinical preparedness, and policy coordination. The model outlined here provides a scalable way to reduce zoonotic spillover risk and strengthen readiness against future coronavirus and emerging zoonotic threats. 

Keywords: Camel vaccination; genomic epidemiology; Healthcare-associated transmission; Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus; One Health; zoonotic spillover.